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1LINCOLN IN CABINET COUNCILS
Chapter I.
Choice of the Cabinet
The evening of his first election day, November 6,
l£60, was spent by Mr. Lincoln in the telegraph office at
Springfield, where he heard the returns a3 they came in. He
went home about two o'clock in the morning, and before evening
of that day, Wednesday, he had selected his cabinet, very near-
ly as he afterwards appointed it. Of course this was not the
first time he had thought about the matter, and one, at least,
of his selection was made much earlier than this. He told Mr.
Seward that he had intended, ever since the day of the nomina-
tion by the Republican national convention at Chicago, to a3k
phim to take charge of the state department. Practically every
choice was made for political reasons. All sections of the
country had to be represented, a point which had great weight
with Mr. Lincoln, different shades of opinion had to be con-
ciliated, and at least his own party firmly united in support
of his administration. Mr. Lincoln knew that his election meant
the crisis in the slavery question, that the South meant to try
the experiment of a legal separation, if possible, and no man
Welles (v. I, p. 32) quotes Lincoln as saying that the choice
of his cabinet was made before the sun went down on Wednesday.
N. and H. (v. Ill, p. 3^7) saY it wa;3 done the evening of elec-
tion day
.
2Lincoln, Works, v.VI, p. 77*

2realized more fully than he the necessity for a strongly united
North, So he picked his men shrewdly with the end of "greatest
strength" in view. It was suggested that two or three South-
erners should be a3ked into the cabinet. This advice to in-
clude some of his political opponents v?as repeated so persis-
tently that Mr. Lincoln had the following questions inserted
in the "Illinois Journal" of December 12: " First . Is it known
that any such gentleman of character would accept a place in
the cabinet? Second . If yea, on what terms does he surrender
to Mr, Lincoln, or Mr. Lincoln to him, on the political differ-
ences between them; or do they enter upon the administration
in open opposition to each other?" The conclusion was suffi-
2
ciently evident to settle the question.
Mr. Lincoln wanted to wait as long as possible before
announcing the names, as he said "to save being teased to in-
sanity to make changes, "^ However, he decided to make certain
of one or two, and on December & he sent two letters to William
H. Seward of Mew York, the first a formal note offering him the
state portfolio, and the second a dignified but friendly letter
k
urging him to accept it. Mr, Seward immediately replied, asking
for a few days to consider, and soon after, he accepted. Mr.
Seward had been the best known candidate for the presidential
nomination before the Chicago convention. He represented the
N . and H . v. Ill, p. 373.
Lincoln, works, v. VI, p«72>.
Lincoln. Works, v. VI, p. 95*
Lincoln. Works, v. VI, pp. 76-77*
N . and H. v. 1 1 1, pp.350-352.

3more conservative faction of the Republican party, as did also
the next member invited into the government, Edward Bates of
Missouri. Mr. Lincoln sent word to him on December 13 that
he would come to St. Louis on the next day to see him, but
Mr. Bates thought it would look better if he came to Spring-
field instead, so he did. He had known Lincoln for eight years,
and hi3 experience as a judge well fitted him for the post to
which he was assigned, that of Attorney General,*
Caleb B. Smith of Indiana wa3 urged by his friends
upon Mr. Lincoln for a cabinet position. Schuyler Colfax, from
the same state, was also suggested for a place in the cabinet,
but Mr. Lincoln chose Smith because he thought Colfax would not
need the place to add to his reputation, and both were equally
p
capable. Mr. Smith was assigned to the department of the in-
terior .
At the time of his election Mr. Lincoln picked out
Gideon Welles of Connecticut for the navy department, J Mr.
_
h
Welles had been chairman of the delegation from his state to
the Republican national convention at Chicago and was a former
Democrat. ^ Before finally deciding, however, Mr. Lincoln asked
the advice of the Vice-President elect, Mr. Hamlin, of Maine,
with whom he consulted freely about different candidates. On
December 2k Lincoln wrote Hamlin a letter, asking which of
*N. and H. v. Ill, pp. 351-352.
^N. and H. v. Ill, pp. 352-35^.
^Welles, v.I, p. 32.
^Welles, v.I, Introduction, p. 20.
-^Welles, v.I, Introduction, p. 13.

4three names the New England delegation would prefer, or if he
should decide it for himself. Mr. Welles was the person who
was chosen as the New England member, Mr. Hamlin and others
recommending him.
Mr. Lincoln desired ex-Governor Chase of Ohio as
head of the treasury department, but Simon Cameron of Pennsyl-
vania also had claims which could not be overlooked. Each had
been the candidate of his state for the presidential nomina-
tion. Mr. Cameron was invited to Springfield for a conference,
and told that he would be offered either the treasury depart-
ment or the war department. But there turned out to be a de-
cided opposition to him in his own state, and Mr. Lincoln asked
to be allowed to recall his offer.-^ Mr. Cameron's friends at
once took up his defense and showered letters upon Mr. Lincoln,
urging his fitness and ability. His enemies also wrote, ^ and
the result was undecided until just before the inauguration,
when it was determined to give Mr. Cameron charge of the war
department. 5 A conference had already been held with Mr. Chase
in regard to the treasury. ^ Mr. Lincoln thought Chase's well-
known integrity would give confidence in the credit of the
government.^ It wa3 pretty well understood that Mr. Chase would
^Lincoln. Works, v. VI, pp. 36-37.
^Welles, v.I, p. 32.
j>N. and H. v. Ill, pp. 35^-357-
ZN. and H. v. Ill, pp. 360-361.
?N. and H. v. Ill, p. 363.
°N. and H. v. Ill, p. 359-

5accept
This left only one place open, that of Postmaster-
General, and since the far South could not be represented, it
wa3 decided to give this position also to a border state,
Maryland. Montgomery Blair, a Democrat of well-known family,
was chosen. It was objected that this would give the predom-
inance to the former Democrats, there being four of them, and
only three Whigs, in the cabinet, but Mr. Lincoln replied that
"he was himself an old-line Whig, and he should be there to
make the parties even,"^
Several changes were made in this group before the
end of Lincoln's presidency. The first was in the war depart-
ment. Cameron did not seem to be the man to manage it in the
existing emergency, and it was hoped that a change would result
in greater energy and efficiency. Some fraudulent contracts
were made under his regime, ^ although probably a good deal of
the censure he received on that account was undeserved. The in-
cident which finally caused his dismissal was the publication,
in his annual report of December 1, 12>6l, of instructions for
arming the negroes as soldiers. This the President wa3 not
ready to do yet, and of course he would not permit his Secre-
tary to do it without first consulting him and obtaining his
consent. The report was recalled at once, and soon after,
1 N. and H. v. Ill, p. 363.
|n. and H. v. Ill, pp. 363-369.
^Welles, v.I, p. 57.

6Mr. Lincoln sent a letter offering Mr. Cameron the ministry to
Rusn ia .
^
To fill the vacant place, Edwin M. Stanton was ap-
pointed Secretary of War. This change was made on January 13,
1362. The nomination was made without any previous consulta-
tion with Mr. Stanton, on the recommendation, Mr. Welles
states, of Secretary Seward.^ Mr. Stanton had been Attorney-
General under Buchanan^ and was a union Democrat. 5 He was a man
of great energy and was firmly resolved to save the union.
The next change was in the interior department. In
December, 1362, Mr. Smith was appointed judge of the United
States district court of Indiana, and John P. Usher, his first
assistant in the department, ^ succeeded him.
The resignation of Mr. Chase will be discussed in a
later chapter. It was sent to Mr. Lincoln June 29, 1364, and
was accepted the next day. David Tod of Ohio was nominated for
the place, but declined before the Senate had confirmed the
choice. Mr. Lincoln then sent in the name of William Pitt
Fessenden of Maine, who was chairman of the Senate committee on
finance. He did not wish to accept, but did, after some urging
by the President. This nomination was immediately confirmed,
9
I*, and H. v.V, pp. 125-122.
Gorham, Stanton, v. I, p. 23$.
/Welles, v.I, pp. 53-59.
jIN, and H. v.V, p. 131.
/Corham, Stanton, v.I, p.239»
Sn. and H, v.VI, pp.lUg-419.
LHarper'f encyclopedip of United States history, v. IX, p. 573
•
°N. and H. v. IX, pp
.
9^-95, p .99
.
?N. and H. v. IX, pp.99-100.

and Mr. Fessenden performed the duties of the office until
early in 1565, when he wan again elected senator from Maine,
and resigned from the treasury department. Many persons were
recommended for the vacancy, but the strongest candidate was
Hugh McCulloch of Indiana, who was ap;ointed, because of his
efficient administration of the office of comptroller of the
currency.
This appointment caused the resignation of Mr. Usher,
Secretary of the Interior, who knew the President's aversion to
having two men from the same state. Ke resigned on the eighth
of March, and Mr. Lincoln accepted, to take effect May 15, 12>65
•
Before that date Mr. Lincoln was assassinated.
One other change had been made, Mr. Bates, the
Attorney-General, a3ked to be relieved the last of November.
The chief reason for this resignation was that he was unwilling
to follow his party into the radical position they had taken
since the beginning of the administration.'' Judge Holt of Ken-
tucky was offered the vacant place, but declined, and James
u
Speed, of the same state, was appointed.
N. and H, v. IX, pp. 345-349.
:N. and H. v. IX, pp. 3^9-350.
N, and H. v. IX, pp. 344-345.
"N. and H. v. IX, pp. 346-347-

Chapter II.
Seward's Management of Foreign Affairs
Secretary Seward always liked to think of himself
as the leader in the administration, and there is no doubt
that when he accepted office, he expected to dominate the cab-
inet and to dictate its policy. He reckoned without a suffi-
cient knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, as he found, to his chagrin.
About April first, (l£6l) he sent to Mr. Lincoln a very singu-
lar letter, stating that the administration had no policy as
yet, and suggesting some fantastic ideas of his own. Ke pro-
posed to start a war with Spain and France as a means of uniting
the North and South, Ke proposed abandoning Fort Sumter but
maintaining all the other forts in the South, He also hinted
that the President might delegate to him the responsibility of
seeing this policy put through.
If Mr. Lincoln had had the slightest desire to dele-
gate his presidential authority to Seward, the contents of this
paper would have given him grave doubts as to the advisability
of such action. At the very least, the avowal of his foreign
minister that he desired a war with two foreign countries must
have given him some uneasiness. However, he answered with his
own rreat tact and patience, pointing out that in his inaugural
address he had set forth precisely the same domestic policy now
urged, except that he did not include the evacuation of Fort
Sumter. He gently but firmly proposed to continue to be the
head of the government. With regard to Seward's demand that

9when a policy wa9 "once adopted, all debates on it must end,"
he replied by insisting that while a policy was being carried
out he wished, and was entitled to have, the advice of his
entire cabinet.^
This proved to be enough for Mr. Seward. He never
again proposed taking the President' s place, but worked so
loyally to avoid complications with foreign countries that he
was often accused of unnecessarily surrendering the dignity of
the United States.
His task proved to be far from easy. It required
all of his skill, patience, and diplomatic ability for the
next few years to prevent foreign nations from taking advantage
of our civil war to involve the United States in some difficul-
ty which would give an excuse for European intervention in Amer-
ican affairs. It would have been impossible to have carried
on a successful war with any foreign nation and at the same
time to have prevented the division of our own country. Almost
every European nation was inclined to sympathize with the South.
If the United States was weakened by the formation of part of
the states into a separate confederacy, they could no longer
enforce the Monroe doctrine, with its policy of forbidding
interference by European nations in the affairs of the American
continent
.
The first question which bade fair to prove serious
^•Lincoln. Works, v. VI, pp. 23^-237.
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was the attack on Mexico. It is unlikely that the United
States would have allowed Mexico to be invaded if they had not
had their hands too full at home to prevent it. The attack on
a neighbor state was a blow aimed at the United States, in-
tended to prevent any further spread of her influence, as the
French Emperor himself wrote to his commander in Mexico* The
immediate cause of the trouble was the suspension of interest
payments on her foreign debt for two years by Mexico. England,
France, and Spain agreed to send a joint expedition against her
to compel the payment of money due them and to seek redress for
other injuries. The United States was invited to join, but
refused, although they also had claims against her. They tried
to prevent the signing of the treaty of alliance by offering
to loan to Mexico anough money to meet her obligations, but the
three powers would pay no attention to this.
Our settled policy of not forming alliances with
foreign nations, our friendly interest in a neighboring state,
whose government was similar to our own, cur sympathy with her
in her existing troubles, and our desire not to see them aug-
mented, were the reasons given by Mr. Seward for refusing to
join the alliance against Mexico.^ He pretended to believe the
powers sincere in the declared purpose of the expedition, and
in their assurance that they intended no interference with the
£n. and H. v.VI, p. 33.
!~N . and H. v.VI, p. 31.
^N. and H. v.VI, pp. 36-4l.
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internal government of the republic. 1 The part taken by Great
Britain wao small, because, owing to the Trent affair, which
happened about this time, she was reserving all her forces for
a possible war with the United States. The allied forces soon
quarreled among themselves, the English and Spanish made sepa-
rate agreements with the Mexican authorities, and withdrew
their forces. This left France alone in her invasion. The
schemes of the French Emperor were not limited to recovering
debts or damages - he desired to plant a new monarchy in Mexico,
under the control of France. The Archduke Maximilian of Aus-
tria was chosen for the throne. ^ But the French were not used
to the Mexican climate, and consequently yellow fever and small-
pox reduced the invading army faster than battles could have
done it.
They soon tired of the enterprise and would have
left the Archduke to his own devices if they could honorably
have done 30. If the United States would only have consented
to recognize the government of Maximilian the French would have
been satisfied. This would have been a guarantee that the
United States would not interfere to help the Mexicans when our
civil war was ended. But Mr. Seward and the President had no
idea of abandoning the Monroe Doctrine, even if public opinion
would have permitted it. All through this affair they main-
tained an attitude of remonstrance, warning the Emperor that
N. and H. v. VI, p.4g.
N. and H. v. VI, p. $9.
N. and H. v.VI, pp.43-45.
'N. and H. v. VI, pp. 4 6-^7.
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the United State9 could not acquiesce in the subversion of the
Mexican government, although not commi tting themselves +o actu-
al war at the moment* It was pretty well understood that the
United States would intervene when the close of the civil war
set her armies at liberty, if the attempt was not abandoned
before that time, and the victories of the Union armies proved
to be strong arguments in favor of recalling the French forces.
Once deprived of their assistance, the new emperor was quickly
overthrown. ^ Mr. Seward had taken the ground that the Mexican
people preferred a republican form of government, that the
former government had not been overthrown, and that we had been
friendly to it, and still were.-' He deserves great credit for
firmly maintaining our objections and leavinp- the way open for
such future action as we might decide to be necessary, without
at the same time giving the French any pretext for beginning
war against us.
In France and England it was all the American envoys
could do to prevent recognition of the Southern confederacy.
The Southern states furnished practically all the cotton for
the world, and thousands of people in Great Britain depended
on the cotton factories for a living. The blockade of Southern
ports cut off the supply of raw material and all of these fami-
lies were reduced to poverty and even starvation. It is no
wonder that Great Britain was tempted to interfere, at least
IN. and H. v. VI I, pp.^CO-403.
;N. and K. v. VII, p. 423.
3n. and H. v.VI I, p.403>.
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to break the blockade.^- They waited a while, however, to watch
events, and finally the results of Vicksburg and Gettysburg
made the British government decide against interference.
It was meanwhile the duty of the Secretary of State,
to look at the matter from a different point of view. He took
the ground that the Southern insurrection was a purely domestic
affair, that the United States had a right to suppress it, and
it was no other nation's business. By constant vigilance and
patience, Mr, Seward and Mr. Adams, the minister to England,
kept the nominal peace between the two countries. But they
could not at first prevent the English government from shutting
its eyes while their ship-builders were fitting cut cruisers
for the Confederate service. Several ships were finished and
got away, although Mr. Adams kept the ministry well informed
of all that was going on. Technical difficulties and delays
were put in the way of detaining these vessels. This attitude
made the ship-builders bolder and they made no secret of the
destination of ships then being built. This enabled Mr. Adams
to make his evidence so complete, that allowing these ships
also to sail would have been an act of open unfriendliness
toward the United States, and the British government decided
to order them detained. After this, no more ships were built
in England for the confederates .5
.Wilson. Division and Reunion, p. 222.
N. and H. v. VI, p.70-72.
'N . and H. v. VIII, pp. 254-2-55 j v. IX, p,12g.
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In France also, the Confederates tried to have ships
built, but did not meet with as good succe?3 as in England,
although promised protection by *he Emperor himself. Convinced
of the hopelessness of the attempt to restore union, the Emper-
or determined to offer mediation. In his reply to this propos-
al, received February 3, 1363, Mr. Seward made a long explana-
tion of the course of the war and the intentions of his govern-
ment with regard to it. He refused, as always, to recognize
the Confederate in any other way than as insurgents against
the national authority, and repeated the President's determina-
tion to uphold that authority. He said that Congress was the
proper place for the representatives of the two sides to meet
and discuss their differences.* When Gettysburg and Vicksburg
had convinced the Emperor that the union government's cause
was not hopeless, he turned traitor to the Confederates.^
N. and H. v.VI, pp. 63-76.
N. and H. v. IX, p,12g.
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Chapter III.
Chase; belles; Stanton; Blair
Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, was Seward's
great rival for the leadership in the cabinet. He, too,
found hard work waiting for him in his department. He found
the national credit very low. A great war had to be provided
for, with expenses which ran up to two millions of dollars per
day before the end. He set about his work with no special pre-
vious training, but with rreat natural ability, and he proved
equal to the emergency. His financial measures need not be
discussed here. It is enough that they were successful. In
fact, the country learned to have so much confidence in his
able management that when he resigned many feared the public
credit would go to pieces at once. In all his measures, Mr,
Chase was consistently supported by the President, In his
messages to congress, and in private conferences with the mem-
bers of both houses, he urged the passing of laws which his
Secretary required.
^
There was but one weak point in Chase' s administra-
tion of the treasury department. He was a poor judge of men.
He often trusted subordinates who were unworthy. He insisted
on making all appointments in his department according to his
own judgment, and without regard to any political considera-
tions. This caused a good deal of trouble sometimes when the
N. and H. v.VI, p. 225-2*1-7
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9enator from the state to which the appointee was sent was not
pleased. Complaints of dishonesty and inefficiency kept coming
to Mr. Lincoln, but if he suggested mildly that the employee
ought to be removed Mr. Chase became angry and defended his
choice against all evidence.
1
Throughout the years that Mr. Chase was associated
with the President he could not get over the idea that Mr.
Lincoln was vastly inferior to himself. The Republican party
had made a mistake and it was his duty to remedy that mistake
as far as he was able. He persuaded himself that all adminis-
trative blunders were made because his advice was not heeded
and that successes were due to his influence. This attitude
of criticism of his colleagues and the President was partly due
to jealousy of Mr. Seward. Seward and Chase were leaders of
rival factions, Mr. Seward represented the conservatives, and
Mr. Chase the radicals, in the cabinet. Mr. Lincoln could
hardly have expected perfect harmony in his councils when he
chose his political rivals for his advisors, but he surely had
a right to expect, when they accepted, that their differences
would not be aired outside the councils. Most of the cabinet
were loyal in this respect, but Mr. ^hase was not magnanimous
by nature. He wanted to be the president, and meant to be the
next one. Accordingly he lost no opportunity for taking credit
to himself or for discrediting Mr. Linco-ln and his other advisers.
N. and H. v. IX, pp.g4-90.
N. and H. v. VI, pp.25^-257.
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He wrote letters to friends in all parts of the country freely
criticizing acts of the administration. lie made friends with
everyone who had been disappointed in any way by the adminis-
tration, intimating that if he had been president, things would
have been very different. This constant disloyalty was reported
to Mr. Lincoln by his friends, who urged him net to keep this man
in his councils. But Mr. Lincoln refused to consider any per-
sonal questions. As long as Mr. Chase managed the finances
with honesty and ability, it was of nc consequence to the Pres-
ident what his personal attitude toward him was. He considered
only the interests of the nation,^-
The re-nomination of Lincoln in 1364 did not improve
the disposition of the Secretary of the Treasury, and his rela-
tions with his colleagues grew less cordial, than before. Trouble
over appointments finally caused him to resign. He had resigned
before, as an expression of his displeasure. He never expected
his resgin^tions to be accepted - he only intended them as a
means of bringing the President over to his point of view, and
he was very much surprised when his last resignation was ac-
cepted. But Mr. Lincoln had decided not to yield his authority,
as this was what it meant. The finance committee of the senate
came over at once to see the President, very much alarmed at
the change. T ney seemed to think nobody but Chase could manage
the department successfully just then. 3 The first nomination
^L. and H.
5H. and H.
^N. and H.
v.VI, pp.2^4-263.
v.ix, pp.§3-95«
v.ix, p. 97.
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for his successor was not popular with the senate but while
they hesitated it was declined. Then Mr. Lincoln sent in the
name of William Pitt Fessenden, the chairman of their own com-
mittee on finance. This was confirmed at once, and confidence
was restored. 1
One incident in connection with the rivalry of Chase
and Seward is worth mentioning. Mr. Seward's careful foreign
policy was much criticized by the radicals in congress, and
they once got together and appointed a committee to go to the
President and demand a reconstruction of his cabinet, at least
so as to leave out Seward. A friend at once carried the news
to the Secretary of State, who of course sent the President
his resignation. Now Mr. Lincoln believed that the choice of
his cabinet was his own perogative, and that he alone was
responsible for the policy of the administration. His minis-
ters must answer f o him for their acts, but not to committees
of congress. So he did not intend to allow this committee to
compel him to dismiss a member of the cabinet. Besides this,
if he sent away Seward, who was the conservative leader, the
radicals would preponderate too much, and the conservative
supporters of Seward would all be turned against the adminis-
tration. To avoid this, the President took a bold step. He
asked the committee to return that evening, and when they came
he had the members of the cabinet there also, all except Mr.
Seward. They talked over matters, clearing up a good many
N. and H. v. IX, pp.99-100
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differences and leaving each other with a much better under-
standing and a friendlier feeling. All the cabinet defended
Mr. Seward, except possibly Mr. Chase, who was placed in an
embarassing position. The result was that Mr. Chase brought
in his own resignation the next morning, and the President
took it with such satisfaction as to astonish the Secretary.
For this gave him his solution of the difficulty. He then
treated both resignations alike, refusing to accept either,
and the crisis was past. After this Mr. Lincoln never al-
lowed anyone to criticize Mr. Seward in his presence without
at once defending him,^
The work of Secretary Welles in the navy department
has not been so widely noticed as that of some of the other
members of the cabinet, as he devoted his attention to it al-
most exclusively, was loyal to the President, and had no ulter
ior political ambitions. It is worth noting, however, that
the long delay in finding commanders who could win victories
with the army was not duplicated in the navy department. Mr,
Welles proved to be a keen judge of men, and he was not afraid
to promote a man who had shown capacity over the heads of his
superiors if he needed him- there. Although he was apparently
a quiet and conservative man himself he always chose daring
commanders. He was willing to take a large risk if there was
a chance for a large result, and small losses never shook his
N. and H. v.VI, pd. 263-272.
Welles. v.I, pp. 157-15g.
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confidence in the final outcome. In this regard he was the
exact opposite of General McClellan, who corn: and ed the army
of the Potomac for so long. Mr. Welles tried out the Monitor
when every one else was making fun of the strange new inven-
tion,^ and the result proved his judgment correct. One of his
wise choices was his assistant secretary, Fox, then a naval
officer, who contributed a great deal to bhe success of the
department. The United States had almost no navy when the war
began. What little there wa3 had b^en sent by secession sympa-
thizers to the farthest parts of the world. By the end of the
four years, the introduction of iron-clad vessels had created
a new era in natfal science.
Mr. Welles would not allow any other member of the
cabinet to meddle with the affairs of his department although
according to his report both Seward and Stanton attempted it.
Early in the administration Mr. Lincoln signed some papers for
Seward without reading them through, and one of them proved to
be an arbitrary order to Welles concerning an appointment in
his department. He was quite angry about it, as it did not
accord with his judgment, and brought it at once to the Presi-
2dent. Mr. Lincoln at once withdrew the order, and apologized.
He always respected the official authority of his cabinet mem-
bers. In her book on "Personal traits of Abraham Lincoln",
Miss Nicolay says "Lincoln's remark that he 'hadn't much in-
pWelles. v.I, pp. 63-64,
Welles. v.I, pp. 16-19.
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fluence with this administration', and that he was 'only the
lead-horse who mustn't kick over the traces', wa3 his way of
saying that if he delegated powers and duties to his cabinet
ministers, that it was only fair to refrain from interfering
while they carried them out,""1"
Mr. Stanton, the energetic chief of the war depart-
ment, was a much disliked man. Secretary Welles has filled
many pages of hi3 diary with caustic criticisms about him.
This general dislike was due to his gruff and disagreeable
p
manner, both to his colleagues and his subordinates. But he
wa3 honest and very energetic. He organized his department
so as to get the best work done and was untiring himself.
There was never a reasonable demand for supplies or troops
from commanders in the field, but the war department tried to
furnish them. as quickly as possible.-^
While Mr. Lincoln's plan of inviting his political
rivals into his government, secured for him men who were able
to bear the great responsibilities of the war, it was not al-
together successful as a lasting combination. Many criticisms
were made and unity in the cabinet often demanded. Finally, the
convention which nominated Mr, Lincoln for his second term in-
cluded in its platform a resolution calling for harmony in the
national councils. If the convention had specified which
Nicolay, Personal traits, pp .246-2^7
.
Welles. v.I, pp. 67-69; pp. 127-129.
N. and H, v,V, pp, 1^0-141
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member of the cabinet should be left out they would not have
agreed, but it is probable that Mr. Blair, the Postmaster-
General woi,ld have be^n the most unpopular.* But Mr. Lincoln
did not at once yield to the storm and dismiss him - he waited
until just before the election. The reason for Blair* 3 dis-
missal was purely political. The Blair family were fighters,
impulsive and quick to resent wrong, and they had therefore
lost many friends since Mr. Lincoln's first election. Mr. Blair
had quarreled with several of hi3 colleagues, and aired his
resentments so frequently that Mr. Lincoln once advised him
that it was wiser not to impute to public men motives which
they did not avow.
In dismissing Blair Mr. Lincoln told him that during
the entire time of his administration of the post-office, there
had not been a single complaint. As for personal relations,
Lincoln said, "Your uniform kindness has been unsurpassed by
that of any friend." Thi3 incident made no break in their
pfriendship.
,N. and H. v. IX, pp.69-70.
N. and H. v. IX, pp. 3 32-3^2.
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Chapter IV.
The Sumter Question: the Trent Affair
The question of reinforcing or evacuating Fort Surnter
was the first upon which a cabinet council was held. The day
after the inauguration Mr. Lincoln received a letter from Mr.
Holt, who was still acting as Secretary of War, telling him
that Major Anderson had provisions for only twenty-eight day3
at Fort Sumter, and must be reinforced or provisioned within
that time or abandoned to the secessionists. After consulting
with General Scott and others the new President called together
his advisers, on March % l36l> to talk over the question.'*'
They had not expected to be called upon to face actual war so
soon and hardly knew what to say at first. They were not pre-
pared to decide anything. Mr. Lincoln asked Oensral Scott
several specific questions, as to the time the garrison could
hold out and the means required to relieve it. Captain Fox,
a young man who had served nineteen years in the navy, offered
to lead an expedition which would run past the Confederate
batteries at Charleston and carry provisions and reinforcements
to Sumter, Many consultations took place. The military and
naval authorities disagreed, the military men thinking that a
large number of troops and a hard battle would be necessary,
while the naval officers believed that a small force could re-
lieve the fort. On March 15, Mr. Lincoln submitted the follow-
N . and H. v. Ill, po30.
N . and H. v. Ill, pp. 330-324.
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ing question to his cabinet for written answers: "Assuming
it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the
circumstances is it wise to attempt it? M ^ It was thought that
the attempt would begin the war. Mr. Chase said on this point
a few days later: "If war is to be the result, I perceive no
reason why it may not be best begun in consequence of military
resistance to the efforts of the administration to sustain
troops of the Union, stationed under the authority of the
government, in a fort of the Union in the ordinary course of
service . w ^
But only two of the cabinet were at first in favor
of relief, and although reluctant to abandon the fort the
President did not like to proceed with a majority against him.
He was also unwilling to act until he had full and complete
information. Mr. Seward 3till hoped to avoid war by some means
i
of conciliation - short of separation. 3 Blair and Chase 'were
the only members of the cabinet in favor of the reinforcement
of Sumter.^" It looked like treason not to sustain the national
troop3 there, 3aid Blair, and it would certainly convince the
rebels that the administration lacked firmness. 5 The most
dreaded result of the beginning of war was its effect on the
border slave states. It was feared that in case of actual war
they would at once unite with the Confederacy. Mr. Lincoln
hi. and H. v. Ill, p. 3^5-
-zN. and H. v. II I, p.430.
pi. and H. v. Ill, p. 3^7.
. and H . v. I II, p. 3-^5 •
?N. and H. v. Ill, p. 336.
°N. and H, b.III, p. 336-337.
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sent Captain Fox to Charleston to consult with Major Andernon
as to his supplies, the possibility of provisioning the garri-
son, the method of doing it, and the limit of time within
which it must be done.* Mr. Lincoln also sent an old friend of
his to Charleston to talk with people he knew there and ascer-
tain public opinion. General Scott advised abandoning Fort
2Pickens also. None of the cabinet were willing that this
should be done, and at length, with all the evidence before
them, the majority gave opinions in favor of relieving Sumter
also, if it could still be accomplished. Mr. Lincoln gave the
order to get ready the Fox expedition. 3 This proved to be too
late, and the only result was perhaps an earlier attack by the
rebels than they might have intended. Sumter fell into their
hands, and at once the wisdom of Mr. Lincoln's waiting policy
was shown. The South had 3truck the first blow, had fired on
the national flag, and this united Northern sentiment. The
issue had been changed from a question of slavery extension to
a question of preserving the nation, and Mr. Lincoln now had
a solid North to back up his authority.
One of the most serious questions to ccme before the
cabinet was the Trent affair. The circumstances were these.
Captain Wilkes, in command of the San Jacinto
,
a United States
war vessel, stopped the British mail steamer Trent on November
*N. and H, v. Ill, pp. 339-391.
tN . and H, v. Ill, p. 39^.
^N. and H. v. Ill, p. ^10.
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£j 1261, and removed two men, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, who
had been ^ent to Europe as commissioners of the Confederacy.
He then allowed the Trent to proceed on her way. Thi3 was
searching a neutral vessel and a violation of international
law, but American public opinion did not stop to think of this
- it only rejoiced that the envoys had been captured and called
for summary punishment. The Secretary of the Navy commended
pCaptain Wilkss for his patriotic act. But the officers of the
Trent took the news to England, where it was received with
great indignation. The British minister got ready a dispatch
demanding reparation and an apology in terms which must have
brought on war, but the Queen and her husband, Prince Albert,
read it over before it was sent and the Prince insisted on
modifying its tone so that it need not be taken as an insult
by the United States. 3 it made our people sufficiently angry
as it was, but it wa3 the business of the President and his
cabinet to settle this question prudently, and avoid war. A
cabinet meeting was called on December 25 to discuss the matter.
Lincoln said we had fought Great Britain for exactly what Cap-
tain T.1rilkes had done. Consistency demanded that we give up the
prisoners.^" Chase admitted the technical right was with Great
Britain and advised giving them up, to avoid the dangers of
delay and explanations, although he admitted that it was *worm-
N. and H. v.V, pp. 20-2^.
N. and H, v.V, p. 25.
N. and H. v.V, pp. 26-30.
N. and H. v.V, pp. 25-26.
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wood and gall" to him. Mr, Bates said all Europe was against
us on the legal point involved, but was willing to let that
go, and urged the necessity of the case. A dispatch to the
French ministsr from his government was read, and it sided
with Great Britain. Mr, Seward had a dispatch ready, which
was discussed. All the cabinet concurred in the decision that
Mason and Slidell must be released. The main objection was
Am2rican public opinion, which would accuse the administration
of weakly giving up to Great Britain, The result proved the
wisdom of the conciliatory policy. The moral effect in Europe
was greatly to our advantage. ^ The confederate mission came to
nothing - it had been too widely advertised. When Mason and
Slidell landed in England they were left severely alone by
the ministry, and all their efforts failed to secure interviews
with them.^"

2g
Chapter V.
Discussion of the Emancipation Proclamation
The first mention of the emancipation of slaves in
the rebel states by proclamation was made by Mr. Lincoln to
two members of his cabinet, Seward and belles, while they were
riding together to the funeral of a child of Secretary Stanton.
This was on July 13, 1362.* At the cabinet meeting on July 22,
the President proposed to issue a proclamation warning the
rebels of the penalties of the confiscation act, and proclaim-
ing the emancipation of all 3laves in states still in rebellion
on January 1, 1363 • Mr. Chase said that he would give the
measure his support, although he thought the same result could
be accomplished in a more effective way by allowinr the generals
to organize and arm the slaves in their departments. In the
President's own account of this meeting, given to Mr, Carpenter,
the artist who painted the picture of the signing of the eman-
cipation proclamation, he said that he had already determined
on the main question, as a war measure, necessary for the sup-
pression of the rebellion. Ke asked advice only on the subject
matter
,
Mr. Blair was against the policy, because he thought
it would lose the administration the fall elections. But Mr.
Lincoln had considered this and all other objections, and had
settled them in his own mind. Mr. Seward suggested that it
,Welles. v.I, p. 70.
Chase. v.I, pp*.47-49.
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would be more effective if issued after a victory, as at that
time, coming just after the worst reverses of the war, it might
be considered the last resort of a defeated government. n, His
idea,' said the President, 'was that it would be considered
our last shriek, on the retreat.' w This suggestion appealed to
Mr. Lincoln and he deferred issuing the proclamation until the
battle of Antietam had occurred. It was sufficiently favorable
to the union arms to give him his excuse for its issue.
^
On September 22, he again called a cabinet meeting
on the subject, of which both Welles and Chase have left ac-
counts. Mr. Lincoln said Artemus Ward had sent him his book,
and he proceeded to read a very funny chapter from it to his
assembled councilors. Mr. Chase reported that they all seemed
to enjoy it very much, except Stanton. The President then be-
came grave, and 3tated that he had decided that the time had
come to issue his proclamation, which he had mentioned to them
before, but had put off. He had made a sort of vow that if
the rebels were driven out of Maryland he would then issue it,
and they had been driven out. He read to them his draft of
the proclamation and invited criticisms. He had determined
the main question; he knew all their opinions on it and had
considered them fully. Mr. Seward suggested two slight alter-
ations, which were agreed to, and Mr. Blair, the only member
who did not assent to the measure, asked permission to file
his objections, which was given. He was in favor of emanci-
Carpenter. Inner life of Abraham Lincoln, pp. 20-22.
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pation in itself, but thought it inexpedient at that time.
He argued that an emanc ipation policy would unite the border
states with the Confederacy, against the government, and would
cause the unionists to lose many votes in the on-coming elec-
tions for members of congress.^- Mr. Stanton gave his emphatic
approval and others expressed their concurrence also. The die
cussion ended, Mr. Seward carried the important document with
him to the state department, and it was published the next
morning.
January 1, 1S63, was the date set for the proclama-
tion to take effect. On December 30 and 31 cabinet meetings
were again held concerning it, and Mr, Lincoln's draft of his
final "edict of freedom" read and criticised. Many changes
were suggested and those which involved no alteration in its
purpose were adopted. Mr. Chase contributed the closing para-
graph. Mr. Lincoln signed the document on January 1, just
after the annual New Year's reception,
^
Chase. Diary, pp.$7~2to.
Welles. v.I, pp. 20Q. 210-211
,
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Chapter VI
.
Maryland; Admission of West Virginia; Fort
Pillow Massacre; McClellan; Grant
Many less important questions were brought up before
the cabinet for discussion or decision. Among them were, the
possible secession of Maryland, the admission of West Virginia,
and the Fort Pillow massacre. One of the first affairs which
caused anxiety in Washington was the attack on union soldiers
in the streets of Baltimore. The situation was discussed with
the mayor in the presence of General Scott and the cabinet. ^-
Maryland' was a doubtful stats - it might secede very easily.
And the legislature had been unexpectedly called together
(April, 12>6l) . Baltimore had added to it ten more secession-
ists at the la^t election. Some members of the cabinet got
very impatient, especially Mr. Chase, but Mr. Lincoln decided
not to interfere. He instructed General Scott not to keep the
legislature from meeting, but to prevent any arming of the
state as a result of its action. But union sentiment in Mary-
land was too strong yet, and the presence of troops helped to
o
prevent the passing of a secession ordinance.
The act for the admission of West Virginia to the
union as a separate state had been passed by both houses of
congress and presented to Lincoln for his signature, when he
pN. and H. v. IV, p. 130.
N. and H. v. IV, pp.165-167.
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asked the written advice of his cabinet, December 23, 1262.
He put two questions, n Is the said act constitutional?" and
"Is the said act expedient?" There were only six members in
the cabinet at this time, the office of Secretary of the
Interior being vacant. They divided evenly on the question,
Seward, Chase, and Stanton answering yes to both questions,
and Welles, Blair, and Bates answering no.^" The constitution
provides that a state may not be divided without its consent.
A provisional government, organized by the loyal people of
Virginia who were free to vote as they wished, had given its
consent - a mere farce, as this provisional government repre-
sented practically the same territory as that which was now
organized as West Virginia.
The members of the cabinet who thought the expedi-
ency most compelling found arguments sufficient to satisfy
them of the constitutionality, while those who thought that
the act clearly violated both the letter and the spirit of the
constitution, not unnaturally looked at the expediency from
another point of view, that of the state of Virginia when re-
stored to her allegiance. It was unfair to the loyal people
now held in the power of the confederates. Mr. Welles said
that all action "should be directed to a restoration of the
Union, and all tendency towards disintegration and demoraliza-
tion avoided." The Attorney-General said that the provisional
government had not been formed to divide or to destroy the old
N. and H. v. VI, p. 300.
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state, and that this was "nothinr lesq than attempted secession,
hardly veiled under the flimsy forms of law."
The equal division of his advisers left the decision
entirely with the President, and he decided to sign the bill.
He based hi3 reasons for doing so chiefly on the necessity for
protecting the loyal population. They regarded their admission
as a matter of life and death. A war measure was not a prece-
dent for times of peace, he said. If it was called secession,
"there was still difference enough between secession against
the constitution, and secession in favor of the cons titution
.
n
He signed the bill on December 31, l£62.^
Another question upon which President Lincoln asked
for written opinions was the action to be taken in regard to
the Fort Pillow massacre. A garrison of union troops, partly
colored, had been overpowered by a large confederate force
under General Forrest, on April 12, 136^, and most of them
killed in cold blood after surrendering. On May 3 the Presi-
dent submitted the facts to his cabinet, and asked their advice.
Seward, Chase, Stanton, and ^elles favored the making of a
demand on the confederate government to disavow the crime, to
puni3h the offenders, or to deliver them to the United States
for trial and punishment. An equal number of rebel prisoners
should be confined as hostages until this was done. All agreed
that the guilty officers should be punished, if captured. But
Blair, Bates, and Usher were against any man for man retaliation.
N. and H. v. VI, pp.305-;>ll.
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There is no doubt which view the President took, an his dis-
like for enforcing the death penalty is well-known. Mr. Usher
urged a telling reason against extreme measures. The union
forces were just about to fight a hard battle with the enemy.
If it were unsuccessful, it might put them in an embarrassing
position. This impending conflict was Grant's Wilderness
campaign, which soon absorbed all attention. The Fort Pillow
affair was lost sight of, and no decision ever made.^
Military and naval affairs often occupied the atten-
tion of the cabinet. Some expeditions were planned or sugges-
ted there, among them the capture of New Orleans. While Gen-
eral McClellan was winning 30 many defeats instead of victories
there was much dissatisfaction with him, in the cabinet, as
well as in the country outside, and once a formal protest was
gotten up and signed by some of the members. But Mr. Welles
refused to sign it, saying that it might seem unfriendly to
the President. He agreed with their opinion of McClellan and
p
expressed his willingness to say so to the President. *~ When
anyone objected to McClellan, Mr. Lincoln always asked whom
they would have instead, and they almost always failed to sug-
gest anyone to replace him.
McClellan was not the only general who became un-
popular at Washington. Secretary Chase was usually one of the
first to get impatient. Before Grant's capture of Vick3burg
pN . and H. v. VI, pp. 4gl-4g4.
Chase. Diary, p. 63.
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had proved that he was a winning general, it began to look a9
if that was to be another long campaign without results. Mr.
Chase reported that General Grant was accused, in the west, of
both incapacity and misconduct, and these adverse comments
were becoming too frequent to be disregarded. He wrote later
from Philadelphia suggesting that Grant be placed under Rose-
crans, and wishing that Sherman could replace Grant, But Mr.
Lincoln said Grant should have his chance.^- Doubts of their
capacity did not keep the government from sustaining its gen-
erals. Grant wrote in 1S64, when he had been placed in chief
command, that everything he asked for had been given him, that
he had never had any complaints to make against the administra-
tion, and that if he did not win the success he expected it was
pm no way the fault of the government.
2N. and H. v.VII, pp. 153-154.
N
.
and H. v.VIII, p. 355.
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Chapter VII.
Cabinet Procedure; The "Three Greatest Republicans";
The Last Cabinet Meeting
Miss Nicolay gives the following account of the
usual procedure in cabinet meetings. She says: "The cabinet
sessions were absolutely informal. Regular meetinrs were held
at noon on Tuesdays and Fridays, when special meetings were
necessary the President or Secretary of State called the mem-
bers together. There was a long table in the cabinet room,
but it was not used as a council board. The President gener-
ally stood up and walked about. The others came in and took
* their seats according to convenience, staying through the
session, or stating their business and departing, as pressure
of work demanded. Sometimes the meeting was opened by a re-
mark or an anecdote by the President; oftener by the relation
of some official or personal happening to one of his advisers."^"
Concerning the relations o^ the cabinet members with
each other Miss Nicolay says, "Lincoln took his Presidential
rivals into his cabinet, and compelled them to be his friends;
but even his genial soul could not warm them toward each other."
She says further: "It eould not be called a harmonious company,
yet the earnest patriotism in the heart of each, and Lincoln's
elastic good nature, held them together fairly well. Newspapers
printed sensational accounts of quarrels, and rumors of whole-
Nicolay. Personal traits, pp .2^2-2^3
.
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sale cabinet changes; but they continued to work together for
the country's good, and changes, when they occurred, were
neither wholesale nor sensational, Lincoln dominated them
from the first, though it was long before they found it out." 1
It was not very long after Seward's ridiculous letter
to Mr, Lincoln that he wrote; "There is but one vote in the
cabinet, and that is cast by the President."^ Mr, Lincoln's
cabinet members were his advisers; he always reserved the de-
cision for himself, and bore the responsibility for its re-
sults ,
One incident shows how they came to trust him. In
the summer of l&6k, when it seemed to Lincoln that he would
be defeated for reelection, he wrote out on a paper what he
would consider it his duty to do if he were not elected. Then
folding the paper in such a way that what was inside could not
be seen, he pasted it. At the cabinet meeting he presented it
to each member in turn, asking him to write his name on the
back, which each did. On November 11, he opened the paper and
read to his councilors what he had pledged himself and them to
do . 5
Nicolay and Hay, in their work on Lincoln, give the
following estimate of him and his two most important cabinet
members: "Lincoln, Chase, and Seward were, by a long interval,
gNicolay, Personal trait3, pp. 23^-235*
^Nicolay. Personal traits, p.239»
and H. v. IX, pp. 250-252.
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the first three Republicans of their time, and each, by what
would appear a special favor of Providence, was placed in a
position where he could be of unquestioned service to the
country. Had either of the three, except Lincoln, been Pres-
ident, the nation must have lost the inestimable services of
the other two." 1
Either of these men would have dominated a weaker
President. Few Presidents would have had courage or self-
confidence enough to risk such a combination. But Mr. Lin-
coln was above all things a skillful manager of men. His
great tact worked wonders, and his persistent disregard of his
personal feelings put him on a higher level than most of his
fellow men. He looked at every question from the standpoint
of service to his country, and that country has to thank him
for being so exceedingly well served.
The last meeting of Lincoln with his advisers was
held on April l4, I065. General Grant was present, and spoke
of being anxious to hear from Sherman. The President said
good news would come from him, as he had had the night before
his usual fream which preceded every important event of the
war, and he described the dream. Reconstruction was discussed
Mr. Lincoln thinking it fortunate that congress would not be
in session, to interfere with their work. He hoped there
would be no vindic tiveness shown toward the conquered Southern
er8. No one need expect him to help in killing the rebels,
XN. and H. v. VI, p.224.
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even the wor3t of them. He said they "must now begin to act
in the interest of peace* •*
He wan not to be allowed to enjoy the psace. That
same night he was assassinated.
1
N. and H. v.X, pp. 231-235.



